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WINTER 1964]
A NEW LIGHT DAWNS-
THE JUDICIAL OPEROSITY OF CHIEF JUSTICE DOE*
JOHN REIDt
T HE SECRETS of most American courts are hidden behind cham-
ber doors. Deliberations are closed to outsiders and even history
is barred entrance to the room. The self-imposed curtain of silence
which appellate judges have rung down to shield themselves from the
prying eyes of a curious profession has served the added purpose of
denying posterity knowledge of how they worked. The door has some-
times opened a crack, and the curtain has often been pierced, but almost
always to reveal the judiciary at its worst rather than its best and
to emphasize its weaknesses rather than its strengths. This is because
when things are going smoothly and a sense of cooperation prevails,
the restraints of fraternal ethics are least strained. It is on occasions
of stress and discontent that the barriers of traditional propriety are
breached. This has meant that aside from information furnished by
published memoirs and private papers, the only glimpses of the inner
routine and activities which legal historians are able to obtain of our
courts have, to an extent, been limited to the extraordinary rather than
the ordinary. This has occurred, for example, when the placidity of
judicial temperament is rumpled by sudden flashes of annoyance which
make headlines in the daily press,' when a refusal by the majority to
admit a brethren into their confidence causes him to complain to the
organized bar by spreading his side of the story across the official
reports,2 when judges, fearful that history may misunderstand the
roles which they played in questionable intra-court maneuvers, prepare
* Research on this paper was supported by a grant from the William Nelson
Cromwell Foundation of New York City.
t B.S.S., 1952, Georgetown University; M.A., 1957, University of New Hamp-
shire; LL.B., 1955, Harvard Law School; LL.M., 1960, J.S.D., 1962, New York
University; Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. The most recent incident of this sort was "an unusually sharp attack," made
by Justice Douglas in the form of "extemporaneous remarks from the bench," on
"a major opinion by his colleague on the Supreme Court, Hugo L. Black," the tenor
of which "startled those in the courtroom." N.Y. Times, June 4, 1963, p. 1, col. 2.
2. As when West Virginia's Marmaduke Dent refused to disassociate himself
from a case in which he was interested. The remainder of the court disassociated
the case from him, barred him from their conferences, and would not even permit
him to see their opinion until it was released to the public. The querulous, garrulous
Dent wrote a dissent in which he bitterly complained about this rather injudicial
treatment. Hartigan v. Board of Regents of West Virginia University, 49 W.Va. 14,
38 S.E. 698 (1901) (dissenting opinion).
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memoranda for their biographers,3 or when brilliant jurists, finding
themselves associated with inept colleagues, pour out their frustration
to contemporaries.'
Courts which are free from personal animosities and official
squabbles have guarded their secrets more jealously. Even the state
tribunal on which more research has been conducted than any other-
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts presided over by Lemuel
Shaw from 1830 to 1860-has given historians few hints about how it
worked. This was the court which guided American law over the
hurdle from an agrestic to an industrial society, and from a mer-
cantile economy geared to the stagecoach to a revolution in legal
developments ushered in by the railroad. Its decisions, at least com-
pared to those of other tribunals, have been catalogued and tallied,
and its rulings have been sifted and sorted. Yet little is known of
how it reached these decisions and rulings, of what compromises had
to be ironed out in chambers because of clashes between obstinate
personalities, and of what opportunities to reshape the future course
of law slipped away because the boldness of Chief Justice Shaw was
restrained by less prescient associates.
Another well-known court of the same type was the New Hamp-
shire bench presided over by Charles Doe. It sheltered extreme shades
of opinion, was burdened with some rather fain6ant members, and
became the target of unusually severe criticism. Yet it apparently knew
no periods of rancor, nor were there ever any outward signs of discord.
Doe dominated that bench as few benches have ever been dominated
in American legal history, and he forced his more conservative col-
leagues to swallow radical innovations about which they were far from
enthusiastic. But when he thought ill health would force him to resign,
they persuaded him to remain by dividing among themselves the nisi
prius work he found onerous, leaving him with only appellate duties
which he enjoyed. In this atmosphere, none had occasion to voice
either public or private complaints to contemporaries or to leave a
record of deliberations for historians. We know little about the daily
routine of the court partly because the judges thought it only routine.
3. The most famous occurrence of this type resulted from the "Legal Tender
controversy." Chief Justice Chase placed his version of the events on file. This led
five colleagues to subscribe to a counter explanation, drafted by Justice Miller, which
told how the members of the court had persuaded Justice Grier to resign. Justice
Bradley saved this "Statement of Facts" for his biographers. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTIcE
MILLER & THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890 163-72 (1939).
4. E.g., the giant of the Wisconsin bench, Chief Justice E. G. Ryan. In a series
of letters to an acquaintance, Ryan left a revealing picture of his court. He called
one of his two colleagues "a flippant, flatulent, unstable dunce." The other he described
as "a dull, dry, obstinate egotist, always satisfied with himself and his work." Letter
From E. G. Ryan to John Orton, Dec. 2, 1877, in BEITZINGER, EDWARD G. RYAN:
LION OF THE LAW 155 (1960).
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What we do know centers mostly around Chief Justice Doe. The
picture which emerges is one of hard work: of the immense amount of
intense labor which he devoted to tireless research, day after day, week
after week, with seldom a break or vacation. "There was," as Pro-
fessor Jeremiah Smith who sat as his associate for a few years has
said, "no end to the amount of drudgery he would go through."' The
simplest matter would lead him off onto the wildest tangents, and some
of his finest reforms resulted from cases which counsel had thought
cut and dried. He filled reams of paper with notes on ideas, quota-
tions and authorities, posing questions which he would answer at
great length and solving one problem only to have his solution turn
up another. These notes were intended for himself or his colleagues,
and some of his best work was never seen outside chamber walls.
New Hampshire lawyers were well aware of the Chief Justice's
indefatigable labor. They were often annoyed by the length of Doe's
opinions, some of which he seemed to fill with everything ht had come
across as if unwilling to omit the slightest discovery. It was not,
however, until Dow v. Northern R.R.,G published after his death, that
the legal profession found out how hard Doe really could work and
that he was capable of making some rather drastic cuts. In that case
a minority stockholder asked the court to enjoin a railroad from leas-
ing its track and rolling stock to a rival. In what has been called "a
single cryptic paragraph,"" Doe granted the injunction. Then he began
to research the question. Ten years later, when he died, he had not
finished the job. He had, however, published part of his findings in
two law review articles, each of which was so long that it had to be
printed in two parts.' The manuscript opinion had never been sub-
mitted to his associates, and obviously he had planned extensive re-
visions. To put it into final, official form the court assigned an editor
who was sorely perplexed as to what to do. He finally got it into
manageable shape by leaving out passages which contained arguments
supporting views fully stated elsewhere and numerous lengthy quota-
tions he believed could be handled by mere reference to authorities.9
Even with these omissions, the decision came to more than sixty-four
printed pages in the New Hampshire reports.
5. SMITH, MEMOIR op HON. CHARLES Don 27 (1897) ; Smith, Memoir of CharlesDoe, 2 So. N.H.B.A. PROCEEDINGS 149 (1897).
6. 67 N.H. 1, 36 At. 510 (1886).
7. KIRKLAND, MiEN, CITIES & TRANSPORTATION: A STUDY IN Nnw ENGLAND
HISTORY 462 (1948).
8. Doe, A New View of the Dartmouth College Case, 6 HARV. L. REv. 161, 213(1892), and Lease of Railroad by Majority of Stockholders with Assent of Legislature,
8 HARV. L. Rtv. 295, 396 (1895).
9. 67 N.H. 1, 3 n.1, 36 Att. 510, 511 n.1 (1886).
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Another characteristic of Judge Doe, well-known to contenipo-
raries, was his habit of carrying legal research to the point of a hobby.
He would investigate questions completely unrelated to any business
before the court, storing away his manuscripts until the right case
came along. Then he would spring his findings on an astonished
bench and bar. If the case never turned up, he would actively seek one
out, inserting his materials into opinions where they were not strictly
germane or even inventing the issue out of whole cloth.'
Knowledge of Judge Doe's assiduous working habits has up to
now rested primarily on his voluminous opinions, the testimony of his
colleagues, and the traditions of the New Hampshire bar. Manuscripts
have recently been discovered which substantiate the legend entirely.
Indeed, they make Doe appear more sedulous than ever and show that
he had a hand in all the appellate decisions of his court, advising,
correcting and even writing the opinions of his associates." One is
especially valuable for the light it sheds on his tireless energy and
on the lengths to which he went to satisfy himself that every question
had been thoroughly explored. Moreover, it shows how a legal genius
can find himself in trouble when he uses some of his more obscure
theories to solve practical issues and how his pedestrian associates
sometimes call a halt to his wanderings.
The case with which this manuscript deals involved a petition for
abatement of taxes which had been filed by the Winnipiseogee Lake
Cotton and Woolen Manufacturing Company against the town of
Gilford. At issue was the correct legal definition of the property
interest which the plaintiffs owned by virtue of their right to use Lake
Winnipesaukee as a reservoir to provide power for their mill.'2 The
plaintiffs' dam stood on an inlet called Long Bay at the head of the
Winnipesaukee River, a tributary of the Merrimack. Since the Mer-
rimack was the main artery of industrial New Hampshire, along which
lay the work shops of Franklin, Concord, Manchester and Nashua, this
dan, by regulating the water level, was of vital importance to most
factories in the state. Gilford, the town in which the reservoir was
located, recognized its value and taxed it accordingly. The matter
had been before the court on several occasions. In 1887, for example,
at a time when Chief Justice Doe was absent," Judge Carpenter had
ruled that water power, or rights in a reservoir of water, are an interest
in the land upon and by which they are created and are taxable in
10. Reid, Ahnost a Hobby, 49 VA. L. REv. 58 (1963).
11. This aspect of the manuscripts has been treated in Reid, Doe Did Not Sit-
The Creation of Opinions by an Artist, 63 COLUm. L. Rxv. 59 (1963).
12. For a history of the action see "Reporter's Note," Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton
& Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Gilford, 67 N.H. 326-27, 36 Ati. 254 (1893).
13. See Sanborn v. Clough, 64 N.H. 315 (footnote at asterisk) (1887).
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the town where the land is situated.14 But just what constituted that
"interest" in terms of rights and duties was still in controversy, and
until it could be determined a tax assessment acceptable to both sides
was remote. After disposing of two minor preliminaries appealed in
1889 and 1891,15 Chief Justice Doe decided to join Associate Justice
Clark at the 1892 September Trial Term and preside over what every-
one hoped would be the final hearing on the matter.
Following the conclusion of the trial, at which evidence of owner-
ship was submitted by both parties, Doe and Clark ruled that under
the original act of incorporation passed in 183116 the plaintiffs had not
acquired, nor had the state parted with, "the title to the basin of Long
Bay (which is a public water), or an indefeasible right to change the
natural level of the water in the bay."' 7 The most which the charter
(and a subsequent amending act passed in 18468 authorizing capital
expansion) had granted, was "a perpetual right to a reasonable use
of the lake as a reservoir and source of a reasonably uniform stream,
for the improvement of the Winnepesseogee and Merrimack rivers." 9
This construction of the legislature's intent, they said, was a possible
basis of ownership for purposes of tax appraisal, but what it meant in
terms of property interests held by the plaintiffs as against the state
was another question.
If, by the true construction, the right above described was not
granted, if the grant is revocable without compensation, or if, on
any ground, the state, by the exercise of any other power than
eminent domain, can stop the plaintiffs' reasonable use of the lake
as a reservoir, or prevent their making reasonable changes in its
natural level, the value of the plaintiffs' property is less than we
have found it to be, and there should be another hearing. While
the wrong that would be done by depriving the plaintiffs and the
Winnepesseogee and Merrimack valley of the benefit of the im-
provement made by the plaintiffs, would be so apparent and so
great as to afford a degree of moral assurance that it would not
14. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Gilford, 64 N.H. 337, 348,
10 Ati. 849, 850 (1887). Throughout this paper the name of New Hampshire's
largest lake is spelled in four different ways: 1) "Winnipiseogee," as it was spelled
in the plaintiffs' corporate charter; 2) "Winnepesseogee," as Doe spelled it in the
lower court opinion (see text at footnotes 19 and 20) ; 3) "Winnepisseogee," as Doe
spelled it in the manuscript and once in the opinion (footnotes 33, 41 and 68) ; and 4)
when it does not appear in a quote it is spelled according to today's standards-"Lake
Winnipesaukee."
15. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Gilford, 66 N.H. 621,
30 Atl. 1121 (1889), and Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Gilford,
66 N.H. 626, 30 Atl. 1121 (1891).
16. Laws of 1831, ch. 37; 10 Laws of N.H. 214-16 (1922).
17. "Reserved Case," Winnepesseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Manufacturing Co.
v. Gilford, Belknap, ss., September Term, 1892, 180 BRIFS & CASES 157, 159 (N.H.
State Law Library).
18. Laws of 1846, c. 437.
19. "Reserved Case," supra note 17, at 161.
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be done, the legal right of the state to do it would affect the value
of the plaintiffs' water power and mill property in Gilford, as
well as the value of all property benefited by the improvement
in N.H. and Mass.2
The implications of this did not seem to worry the plaintiffs'
attorneys. When the defendants appealed, they declared themselves
"willing to accept the conclusions of the presiding justices upon the
law" and moved "that decrees be entered accordingly. ' 1 But the refer-
ence to "moral assurance" balancing "the legal right of the state"
showed that something troubled Judge Doe. Regardless of what the
plaintiffs may have thought, Doe believed that the decision which he
and Clark had written threatened their interests. And some of these
dangers were of his own creation.
One of the matters which the Chief Justice had studied as a
hobby had been the ownership of bodies of fresh and salt water such
as lakes and ponds. He waited thirty-six years for the right case to
come along before he was able to put his research to practical use,22
and when it finally turned up he wrote one of his most far-reaching
and controversial opinions. The case he had waited for was Concord
Mfg. Co. v. Robertson,28 and the rule he laid down was that New
Hampshire's great ponds and lakes belonged to the people and were
held by the state in trust for their common benefit. A great pond
or lake he defined as one of ten acres or more in extent. The "pretended
reasoning" behind the long, involved, and often abstruse opinion,
which went directly counter to every English, Irish, and American
precedent on the subject, has been called unsound by one observer,24
criticized by one court,25 and followed by none. It is a classic example
of Doe's tendency to legislate. It laid down a doctrine of substantive
law of vast importance to lake-studded New Hampshire, a doctrine
which the Chief Justice used to strip littoral land owners of exclusive
control over ponds which they had stocked, cleared and maintained
and which they had long believed their own private property.26 This
was probably all he had in mind-to preserve New Hampshire's lakes
and piscaries in common for all the people and to keep them from
20. Ibid.
21. Brief for Plaintiff, Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Gilford,
Belknap, ss., December Law Term, 1893, 180 BRIEFS & CASES 169 (N.H. State
Law Library).
22. See Reid, op. cit. supra note 10, at 63.
23. 66 N.H. 1, 25 At. 718 (1889).
24. Hening, Charles Doe, in 8 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 241, 301 (Lewis
ed. 1909).
25. Percy Summer Club v. Astle, 145 Fed. 53 (C.C.D.N.H. 1906).
26. Percy Summer Club v. Welch, 66 N.H. 180, 28 Att. 22 (1889); State v.
Welch, 66 N.H. 178, 28 Atl. 21 (1889).
[VOL. 9 : p. 233
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falling into the hands of a privileged few as lie believed had happened
in England.27
It was apparently not until he began considering the Gilford
case that the full implications of the doctrine dawned on Chief Justice
Doe. In fact, it seems likely that this was why he sat on the trial
below. He had long since given up presiding at trials, except those
involving capital punishment, but it is possible he may have journeyed
north for this case in order to help lay a proper factual foundation
for the decision he wanted.
Doe realized what Robertson, carried to extremes, could mean
to mill companies like Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton and Woolen. If
ponds of over ten acres were held by the state in trust for the people,
what right had private corporations to make them into reservoirs
and raise and lower water levels whenever they pleased? If they had
no definable property interest in these bodies of water which could be
protected in court, then New Hampshire's industrial enterprises would
depend on the grace of the legislature for their power, a situation the
Chief Justice (who based all his constitutional tenets on a social-
compact theory limiting the role of government and protecting the
equality of property28 ) would have deplored.
At the Trial Term Doe and Clark had been well aware of their
dilemma. They also knew that on appeal the parties might ask the
court to settle the question of ownership. If that happened the state
should be heard, and so they ordered copies of their opinion sent to
the Governor and Attorney General.29 The Chief Justice either did
not trust the Attorney General to act, or lacked confidence in his ability
to appreciate the problem, because a few weeks later, after further
investigating the legal issues, Doe prepared an amicus brief for the
government to submit. This is the manuscript which has recently been
uncovered lying in the vaults of the New Hampshire Supreme Court.30
It is in every respect a remarkable document. Here was the Chief
Justice of the state writing an argument to be used before his own
court by a potential party in litigation upon which he would be officially
barred from sitting, since he had participated in the trial below. The
Attorney General, to whom he planned to send the brief, was Edwin
G. Eastman, appointed just three months earlier to succeed Daniel
Barnard. What Doe would have done had Barnard still been in office
is a question, since Barnard had served as counsel for the plaintiffs
27. Concord Manufacturing Co. v. Robertson, 66 N.H. 1, 19, 25 At. 718, 727(1889).
28. Note, Doe of New Hampshire: Reflection on a Nineteenth Century Judge,
63 HARV. L. Rv. 513, 520-22 (1950).
29. "Reserved Case," supra note 17, at 165.
30. Manuscripts File 579, Doe Papers, New Hampshire Supreme Court (here-
after cited as Mss.).
WINTER 1964]
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during three of the four previous appeals.3 To complicate the matter
further, George A. Bingham, who while a judge had presided at one
of the trials, -3 2 had retired and was now acting for the defendant. He
had been succeeded by William Chase, who was assigned to write the
opinion. Whether Doe ever intended telling Chase the true origin of
the state's brief, had the Attorney General submitted it, will never
be known.
The manuscript is no mere collection of notes, arguments, or
suggestions. It is a formal brief in every respect. Upon receiving it all
the Attorney General would have had to do was to sign his name at
the end. Doe considered each essential point. He cited authorities
in full, provided liberal quotations from cases and referred to his own
decisions in the third person. Although otherwise unimportant, the
opening paragraph is worth quoting since it exemplifies the general
tenor of the entire work. Doe does not even leave it to the Attorney
General to determine the state's interest, but decides for him what type
of appearance to enter and upon which statutes to rely:
A copy of the reserved case having been sent to the Attorney
General by an order of the court made at the trial term, some
response from him seems not to be out of place. The reason
given for the order was that "the state may desire to be heard["].
It is the duty of the attorney general to act for the state in all
''civil causes in the supreme court in which the state is interested."
Pub. St. c. 17, s. 4. The state is a party to no pending suit in
which any right in Lake Winnepisseogee or any other public
water is brought in question, & cannot be made a party to this
suit without its consent. Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527. It
has not consented, & does not now consent, to be made a party,
or to be bound by the judgment to which one of the parties is
entitled. This situation raises the question whether the state is
"interested" in the cause, within the meaning of the statute; & on
this question there may be a difference of opinion. As no public
right, claimed under the state's title, can be conclusively deter-
mined by the judgment that must be rendered in this suit, there
is a sense, limited to that view of the subject, in which the state
may not be interested in the result. But a decision of questions of
law & fact involved in the case might be attended by some con-
sequences that would have a practical effect in future suits in
which the state may elect to appear as a party & assert either its
whole title, or some public rights involved therein. My duty will
apparently be done, without entering either a general or special
appearance for the state, by submitting the following suggestions
as amicus curiae.
31. See cases reported at 64 N.H. 337, 10 At. 849 (1887) ; 66 N.H. 621, 30 Atl.
1121 (1891) ; 66 N.H. 626, 30 Atd. 1121 (1891).
32. The appeal of this case is reported at 64 N.H. 337, 10 Atl. 849 (1887).
33. Mss. File 579, supra note 30, at 1-2.
[VOL. 9 : p. 233
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From there Doe went on to fill thirty-seven more large sheets of paper
for the Attorney General, all in his meticulous clear handwriting,
doctored with interlineations, alterations, and marginal notes.
The question which the Attorney General was supposed to fear
might be settled in the state's absence related to the lower court de-
cision by Doe and Clark that the acts of 1831 and 1846 granted the
plaintiffs a reasonable use of Lake Winnipesaukee as a reservoir. In
Robertson it had been held that alienation of the title of the soil
beneath a great pond or lake was "not an executive function."34 "It
was," Doe said in the brief, "assumed that the legislature have the
power, but the question has not been settled or considered by the
court."3 An adoption of his lower court opinion that the legislature
had made a limited grant would imply that it also had power to convey
title in fee. Moreover, he continued, "If one of those rights can be
alienated without a trial of this question, & without a decision of it
in favor of the grantee, all of them can be given away, the state's
title to the soil can be rendered worthless, & the entire beneficial
interest of the public in inalienable trust property can be extinguished.
There is no distinction but a verbal one between a conveyance of
land, & a conveyance of all the rights in the land that can be useful
to its owner."3 6
What Judge Doe wanted the Attorney General to argue was that
he and Clark had been wrong; that a careful reading of the plaintiffs'
charters showed that nothing had been conveyed "but authority to
do, as a corporate body, what they could have done as unincorporated
partners . . . by exercising their private rights as landowners, with-
out overflowing highways, or invading public rights or public property.
No section, line or word of either act can be construed as a conveyance
of land or an interest in land, or as evidence that such a conveyance
was thought of."3  This, Doe knew, would have placed the entire
problem back where it had been at the start-what was the nature of
the property interest which the plaintiffs owned (and the defendant
taxed) by virtue of their right to use Lake Winnipesaukee as a reser-
voir and to raise and lower water levels?
Seeking the answer in the amicus brief, Chief Justice Doe con-
sidered and rejected in lengthy, involved discussions three possible
solutions. The first was the argument that, by implication, the legis-
lature in 1831 had intended to grant a right in fee since it sought
34. Concord Manufacturing Co. v. Robertson, 66 N.H. 1, 6, 25 Ati. 718, 720(1889).
35. Mss. File 579, supra note 30, at 3.
36. Id. at 6-7.
37. Id. at 20.
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to encourage manufacturing and the plaintiffs' dam benefited the entire
state by helping to regularize flowage along the Winnipesaukee and
Merrimack rivers. In reply to this, Doe would have had the Attorney
General answer the question Robertson had left open and argue that,
regardless of any intention, the legislature would not have had the
constitutional authority to make such a grant. The first reason he
suggested was that any right of exclusive private use and control would
be incompatible with the purpose for which the state held great ponds
and lakes in trust for the people.38 No matter if every voter in the
state agreed the plaintiffs' dam was beneficial to New Hampshire, it
was still not a use beneficial to the public in the sense that it improved
the trust estate. 9 Nor was it "a public benefit for which the power of
taxation can be exercised."4
If the legislature cannot grant cash from the state treasury to
improve the Winnepisseogee & Merrimack rivers for the private
benefit that would ensue in the private use of the manufacturing
power of those streams, on what grounds can they, for the same
private benefit, grant a perpetual use of nearly 713/ square miles
of land which the state holds, in a special trust, by a title that is
inalienable except so far as parcels can be granted without detri-
ment to the public interests in that tract of land.4'
The next argument rejected by Judge Doe was that the state may
grant perpetual interests in great ponds and lakes for private uses to
a reasonable extent. He said this amounted to a claim that there are
reasonable limits within which the violation of inalienable rights may
be legal. 42
A grant of a perpetual private use of it for the benefit of mills
below the dam, whether reasonable or unreasonable, is a surrender
of a part of the public title-a conveyance of an interest in nearly
71/4 acres of the state's land. The qualification of reasonableness
does not affect the question of legislative power .... If any realty
passed by those acts, more of the same estate can be conveyed, for
the same or similar private use, by additional acts, until nothing
of any substantial value is left in the private owner.4 3
The third argument Judge Doe took up had to do with what he
called "the erroneous doctrine of an incidental private reservoir ease-
ment in public waters."44  The doctrine was based on the theory
that water power is part and parcel of the abutting real estate. It had
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id. at 7-8.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id. at 9-10. (The 71Y square miles refers to Lake Winnipesaukee.)
42. Id. at 11.
43. Id. at 12.
44. Id. at 37.
[VOL. 9 : p. 233
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been long accepted and acted on in New Hampshire. Doe thought this
explained why nothing was said of property rights in the plaintiffs'
original charter; the incorporators saw no need to mention what they
believed they already had.45 The doctrine had been given the force
of authority by former Chief Justice Bellows in an opinion to which
Doe had concurred separately.46 And at least one subsequent case
which discussed it had involved the present parties.47 But now it gave
Doe trouble. In Robertson he had suggested that a governmental
grant of abutting land conveys no title to the soil under a great pond
even if the land entirely surrounds the pond.4" More recently, he had
said that a private owner of all the littoral property could not acquire
title to the bed of a pond by prescription.49 These pronouncements
seemed to cut the ground out from under the "easement" doctrine as
laid down by Judge Bellows, even though Bellows had been careful
to say that the easement did not depend upon prescription, but was
an incident to the land.50 Besides, Bellows' reasoning had been un-
satisfactory and precedents not based on sound reasons carried no
weight with Doe. He saw no way around the views that he had ex-
pressed in Robertson, and in the amicus brief he had the Attorney
General deny the "soundness" of Bellows' easement theory and assert
that it "must be regarded as overruled."'"
This just about exhausted all arguments. After thirty-eight pages,
Judge Doe not only eliminated most possibilities, but overruled the
one theory of ownership that (at least for purposes of taxation) had
been accepted in the past. He was quite discouraged. He had an un-
qualified faith in the common law's ability to settle every problem
without legislation, but now it seemed to be letting him down. This
was doubly bad, for not only would the legislature have to enact law
to straighten out the problem, a solution Doe intensely disliked, but it
might be legislation of an especially undesirable kind. More likely
than not, some politicians would take advantage of the embarrassment
in which mill operators would find themselves once the Court held
they owned no interest in their reservoirs, and would seek to win
votes by making them pay exorbitant rates for privileges which, before
Robertson, nobody had doubted belonged to them. Confiscatory was
what Doe called legislation of this sort. He had recently gone to
extreme lengths to prevent the state from exercising a right, reserved
45. Ibid.
46. Cocheco Manufacturing Co. v. Strafford, 51 N.H. 455 (1871).
47. Gilford v. The Winnipiseogee Lake Co., 52 N.H. 262 (1872).
48. Concord Manufacturing Co. v. Robertson, 66 N.H. 1, 6, 25 Atl. 718, 720 (1889).
49. State v. Welch, 66 N.H. 178, 179, 29 Atl. 21, 22 (1889).
50. Cocheco Manufacturing Co. v. Strafford, 51 N.H. 455, 461 (1871).
51. Mss. File 579, supra note 30, at 35.
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in the original charter, to buy the Concord Railroad at less than the
current market price.52 As a result, both he and the court were then
being subjected to one of the most bitter attacks ever directed by the
press against the judiciary in America.3 He surely wanted to avoid
risking a repetition, yet if the issue of reservoir ownership could not
be quietly resolved by an action such as this, it might well have to be
settled by overruling a "confiscatory" law with all New Hampshire
looking on. Judge Doe's constitutional tenets and ideas on govern-
ment were involved in a question of this sort, and there can be no
doubt that he would have annulled any statute, no matter how popular,
which sought to capitalize on the mill owners' predicament.
These considerations-the desire to solve the Robertson dilemma
in a manner equitable to all sides and to keep his court free from
political controversy-form the background for understanding the high
spirits and buoyant enthusiasm with which Doe suddenly broke off the
amicus brief. The thirty-ninth page of the manuscript which contains
the brief is written in the form of a note, dated on the morning of
November 23, 1893. The Chief Justice had apparently passed a rest-
less night, but now the concern and worry are over. A great load has
lifted from his shoulders, and he describes to himself the sheer joy of
finding a solution:
The foregoing [i.e., the first thirty-eight pages] was written with
the idea that if it were presented to the court & the parties, as
suggestions made in behalf of the state, & extended & applied by
further suggestions according to the views entertained by the
writer when the foregoing was written, the result might be that
there would be judgment by agreement."4 The mischiefs of that
result were apparent. Great interests would be left on no legal
footing. Demagogues would be tempted to endeavor to induce the
legislature to levy black mail on the great numbers of people who
use ponds of more than 10 acres as reservoirs. But I saw no way
of avoiding that result. After long & severe cogitation, a new
light dawns. Judge Bellows was right. Everybody & everything
is right. The law is equitable & wise, & clear as the sun, although
I didn't apprehend it till after sunrise this morning. This change
of view changes my whole plan. I will send this to Chase instead
of the gentleman for whom it was written, changing the con-
clusion, & completing it according to the new light.55
52. In re Opinion of the Justices, 66 N.H. 629, 33 Atl. 1076 (1891).
53. For newspaper reaction to Doe's decision in Corbin's Case see RICHARDSON,
WILLIAM E. CHANDLER, REPUBLICAN (1940).
54. Doe had intended that the Attorney General would urge the parties to agree
that extension of the plaintiffs' property specifically authorized in the second charter(1846) could have been accomplished in no other way than by "using the lake as a
reservoir." This would have avoided the need for determining whether the ruling
made at the trial by Doe and Clark was correct, and would not have been prejudicial
to the state since it would not have been bound. Mss. File 579, supra note 30, at 16.
55. Id. at 39.
[VOL. 9 : p. 233
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1964], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss2/4
A NEW LIGHT DAWNS
Nowhere else can the reason for Judge Doe's achievement of
judicial greatness be seen more clearly than in this note written during
the early hours of a November morning. His insatiable quest for the
proper solution to every legal issue is shown by the immense amount
of labor he had already poured into the first thirty-eight pages of the
manuscript. His unselfish devotion to scholarship is shown by the
fact he originally intended that the product of his untiring research
should be presented to the world as the work of the Attorney General
and in no way add to his fame or credit. His love for the common
law, something he stated on many occasions, is shown by the excite-
ment with which he discovers that once again the answer to a difficult
problem is to be found among its "wise" principles. And his belief
that justice and reasonableness are the foundations of all true law is
shown by the satisfaction he expresses now that the matter at hand
can be settled in a manner equitable to all parties.
The "new light" apparently dawned upon Chief Justice Doe while
rereading his decision in the Robertson case."0 He saw that Judge
Bellows had been right, but for the wrong reasons. There was, as
Bellows had said, an "established right of abutters to a reasonable
private use of public waters," but Bellows' explanation that the right
was founded on an easement incidental to the land still did not satisfy
Doe. It did not express the reason of the law. For the correct explana-
tion of the right he turned to his jurisprudential theory that the
common law is a system of "natural principles," adopted by custom
and consent, growing out of the usage and conditions of a progressing
society5 As he expressed it, the right had been sanctioned by the
"experience of more than 250 years."5 8
The private use of a large pond as a reservoir for manufac-
turing purposes by building a dam & opening & shutting gates at
the outlet, differs materially from other rights of using the same
pond which are incidents of abutting lands. But the difference is
not a conclusive argument against the reservoir right. The private
right of wharfing out for purposes of navigation, differs materially
from other water rights vested in the littoral proprietors. Unalike
as these rights are, they are all alike in one respect,-they are all
confined within the bounds of reasonableness. Within that limit,
no reason is perceived for denying the reservoir right "founded
on necessity & convenience, & maintained by uniform usage."
through the long period in which it has been so exercised that it
56. The pages to which he refers are 66 N.H. 1, 17-20 (1889).
57. Smith v. Furbish, 68 N.H. 123, 150, 44 Atl. 398, 411 (1894); Brooks v.
Howison, 63 N.H. 382, 386 (1885); Stratton v. Stratton & Ladd, 58 N.H. 473,
474 (1878).
58. Mss. File 598, supra note 30, at 48.
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would have been questioned & contested, if it had not been uni-
versally recognized as a legal right growing out of the situation &
circumstances of the people which are one of the chief sources of
the common law.59
"This is the whole point of the case," he told his colleagues. "The
fact of universal understanding & usage should be asserted in the
broadest & strongest terms, unless you find on inquiry that the outlets
of ponds of more than 10 acres have not been used, from the first
settlements, by unincorporated & incorporated persons, without any
legislative grant of reservoir rights in the ponds."" °
When the appeal was heard he would not be sitting, so he told
Judge Chase to have counsel investigate the history of usage of mill
ponds in New Hampshire to determine if, without specific legislative
grant, it was always understood that owners had a reasonable right to
use public waters for reservoirs. "If the number & the fact are what
I anticipate," he added, "why won't you have an impregnable basis
of usage for a decision that will do justice & prevent an immense deal
of demagogic agitation, & alarm & perhaps iniquitous legislation against
the owners of the outlets ?61
If the court adopted this solution, then the ruling made by Clark
and himself at the trial term, "that the plfs have 'a perpetual right to
a reasonable use of the lake as a reservoir & source of a reasonably
uniform stream' was correct, & the supposed derivation of the right
from statutory construction instead of the common law, was an error
that did not affect the legal merits of the case or the judgment that
should be rendered."
62
Doe almost pleaded with Judge Chase to adopt these views, telling
him how he had worried that, because of the Robertson decision, he
had been "thrown into a dilemma from which there was no escape
without much ensuing mischief."
At the trial, Clark & I were sorely troubled by the question,
& didn't think of this way of solving it. We did the best we could,
but saw that our solution of the difficulty would expose to damage
or ruin all mills at outlets where the owners were not incorporated,
& that demagogues would not be satisfied with our construction
of plfs' charter. If the foregoing suggestions are found to be an
adequate, equitable & legal solution of the whole question, I shall
be greatly relieved.6"
59. Id. at 43.
60. Id. at 43-44.
61. Id. at 45.
62. Id. at 47.
63. Id. at 45-46.
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Chief Justice Doe wanted Judge Chase to do more than just adopt
"the foregoing suggestions." He expected him to use the opinion as
he, Doe, had written it, and sent him everything, including the thirty-
eight page amicus brief which needed only a few omissions and a
slight shifting of emphasis to serve as a judicial decision. He knew,
however, that the laconic Chase, who was never known to have a
refreshingly original thought in his life, was "abnormally & excessively
squamish abot [sic] using other folks' ideas."64 So Doe tried to im-
press him with the seriousness of the problem and begged him to lay
his scruples aside just this once.65
What happened after this is unknown. For some reason-either
because he did not share Doe's sense of urgency regarding the problem,
or because he remained true to his practice of not using "other folks'
ideas," Chase ignored the manuscript sent him by the Chief Justice.
Instead of taking the broad road of judicial legislation which Doe
would have taken, he followed the narrow path of judicial restraint
which was not on Doe's map. Just as Doe was the type of judge who
could not resist creating new law when the need arose, Chase was the
type of judge who could not resist settling matters on a technicality
or on a point of fact. He knew that Doe's prime violation of the tenets
of decision writing was his practice of extending issues beyond conven-
tional limits in order to widen the range of discussion. This was how
the Chief Justice, who had much to say, squeezed far-reaching opinions
from unchallenging fact patterns. Chase's main strength as a judge
was that he did the opposite and confined issues to their proper limits.
He knew he had nothing to say.
Anyone reading Judge Chase's opinion would have no idea of
the toil and worry Chief Justice Doe had given to the matter of
defining the property interest possessed by mill owners in reservoirs
formed from great ponds and lakes. Indeed, it would be difficult to
guess that it had even been regarded an issue. Chase relegated it to a
point of procedure and dismissed it in his first three sentences.
The finding that the plaintiffs' charter conveyed to them
rights in the lake, as stated in the case, is favorable to the defen-
dants. Its tendency was to increase the market value of plaintiffs'
64. Reid, supra note 11, at 71.
65. If I should be silent, it is possible that the enclosed views would not be
brought to light .... The interests involved in this & many other similar cases
are so great, that it would be a serious mishap if any material view were over-
looked. In this state of things I concluded to send enclosed to you. If you don't
approve the views there presented, no harm will be done. If you do approve
them, you must, for obvious reasons, present them as your own. Everything said
in consultation is told out of doors; i.e. you must assume it will be unless every-
one is interested not to tell it. Much mischief has been & will be done in that way.
Letter From Charles Doe to William Martin Chase, Nov. 24, 1893, in File 579,
Doe Papers, N.H. Supreme Court.
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real estate. The defendants have no occasion to object to it; and the
plaintiffs have waived their objection by moving for decrees .... 66
Later, in the body of the opinion, when discussing an issue of evalua-
tion, Chase added: "This control of the lake as a reservoir is limited
within the bounds of reasonableness, having reference to the rights of
riparian owners upon the rivers forming its outlet."67
The only thing salvaged from Judge Doe's labor was tucked away
in the statement of facts made by the Court Reporter, so obscure and
subtle as to go almost unnoticed. In the unpublished opinion filed with
the judgment they had made at the trial, Doe and Clark had said that
the legislature, by the acts of 1831 and 1846, had "granted to the
plaintiffs a perpetual right to a reasonable use of the lake as a reservoir
and source of a reasonably uniform stream, for the improvement of
the Winnepiseogee and Merrimack Rivers."6 In the statement of facts
the Reporter or Doe or perhaps even Chase changed this to read:
It was held that the state, by the acts of 1831 and 1846, granted
to the plaintiffs a perpetual right to a reasonable use of the lake
as a reservoir and source of a reasonably uniform stream for the
improvement of the mill privileges upon Winnepesogee and Mer-
rimack rivers, subject to the limitation that the right of naviga-
tion upon the lake should not be unreasonably impaired thereby,
and also subject to the right of the owners of mill privileges upon
said rivers to have the water of the lake come down its natural
course, without unreasonable diminution or an unreasonable degree
of irregularity caused artificially.9 (Emphasis added.)
The italicized words were taken from that part of the manuscript
which Doe had written originally as an amicus brief for the Attorney
General." They state the principle of ownership which the Chief
Justice wanted to establish, but do not explain the theory of social
usage upon which it is based. And of course they meant little, for even
if the principle of reasonable use were noticed and its importance were
appreciated by the bar, the opinion made it clear it was not adopted as
law in New Hampshire. At the very most, it rested on a judgment at
the trial term; a judgment founded on an erroneous construction of the
acts of 1831 and 1846.
By most standards, Judge Chase was right and Chief Justice Doe
wrong. At least Chase showed himself a more faithful adherent to the
66. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. Gilford, 67 N.H.
514, 517, 35 Atl. 945, 946 (1893).
67. Id. at 520, 35 Atl. at 948.
68. "Reserved Case," supra note 17, at 161.
69. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. Gilford, 67
N.H. 514, 515, 35 Atl. 945, 946 (1893).
70. Mss. File 579, supra note 30, at 4.
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common-law process. The usefulness of the judicial decision, after all,
is limited to the facts of each particular case, and its function is to
settle controversies which arise in bona fide actions between competent
parties. As Chase knew, its utility is jeopardized when it becomes a
peg for solving potential problems not yet in litigation. This was too
confining for Charles Doe. To him the common law was not merely
a collection of doctrines, rules, and guides sanctified in precedent.
Rather it was the application of right reason to specific circumstances
and existed independently of official pronouncement. As a result, he
drew little distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum since
dictum which expressed the reason of the law carried more weight,
than unreasonable ratio which represented the law's authority.7 He
believed that the function of a common-law judge was to make law
with bold strokes and not to avoid issues by using technicalities. In
the New Hampshire of 1893 many large business enterprises, involving
thousands of people and vast expenditures, were caught in a legal
dilemma which seemed to result from the discovery that private rights
in reservoirs might conflict with the public ownership of great ponds.
Was it not, he asked, the duty of the court to set minds at ease and
avoid expensive litigation by declaring at the first opportunity the
correct principle of property law which solved the dilemma? His
critics-and there were many-would have answered no; the Chief
Justice should have learned a lesson from the consequences of his
decision in Robertson. Had Doe restrained himself there, had he not
deliberately formulated a new rule of substantive law uncalled for by
the strict facts of that case, the troublesome dilemma would have never
existed. Judge Doe believed that one of the evils of legislation was
that it bred the need for more legislation. His critics could have said
he had proved the same thing true of judicial legislation.
Perhaps this was what Chase told him: that he had gone too far,
and it was time to call a halt. Chase may have been awed by Doe's
industry and sympathetic with his desire to rewrite New Hampshire
law according to the dictates of reason, but he refused to be the means
by which Doe formulated the doctrine of reasonable usage for private
reservoirs in public waters. It is mainly because he created law in this
manner, that Charles Doe is remembered as one of the greatest judges
in American legal history. Judge Chase is remembered because he was
an associate of Chief Justice Doe.
71. "The maxim which, taken literally requires courts to follow decided cases
is shown by the thousand of overruled decisions, to be a figurative expression requir-
ing only a reasonable respect for decided cases." Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N.H. 353,
602 (1870).
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